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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Toward this symposium’s goal of examining the causes of the frequency with 
which employment discrimination cases lose on pretrial dispositive motions, both on 
appeal and in district courts, this article surveys a limited sample of plaintiffs’ briefs 
on appeals of Rule 12 dismissal motions and on district court Rule 56 summary 
judgment motions. The results of this survey suggest the following.
1.  Most plaintiffs’ lawyers file briefs that badly neglect key, 
on-point circuit authority—precedents supporting their claims 
and undercutting debatable defenses.1
2.  Many (though not most) plaintiffs’ lawyers literally do not even 
try to rebut key employer arguments, instead just reiterating 
their factual allegations without noting whether the defense 
correctly cited the case law supporting dismissal of the claims.2
3.  A minority but disturbing number of the worst briefs contain 
only unhelpful boilerplate reiterations of legal standards, with no 
precedents directly applicable to the case—suggests that those 
lawyers do no case-specific legal research.3
 Good briefs do not guarantee success, of course;4 courts have been known to 
dismiss seemingly meritorious claims without the assistance of weak plaintiff ’s 
lawyering. David Lee, recounting circuit decisions defying summary judgment 
standards, notes that a number of such decisions came despite collaboration (including, 
among other things, argument mootings and brainstorming sessions) among lawyers 
active in the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), the most 
prominent plaintiffs’ employment lawyer bar association:
Nor were these cases instances of poor argumentation . . . . most of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . were veteran NELA members—including some very 
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part III.A.2.
4. See, e.g., Gladwin v. Pozzi, No. 06 Civ. 0650(SCR)(JFK), 2010 WL 245575 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) 
(granting defendant’s summary judgment motion); Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, Gladwin v. Pozzi, 2007 WL 4845955 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 
2007) (No. 06 Civ. 0650(SCR)(LMS)) (excellent plaintiff ’s brief opposing summary judgment); Stodola 
v. Finley & Co., No. 2:05-CV-464-PRC, 2008 WL 3992237 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2008) (granting 
defendant’s summary judgment motion); Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Stodola v. Finley & Co., 2008 WL 900340 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2008) (No. 2:05 
CV 464) (excellent plaintiff ’s brief opposing summary judgment); Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, 
No. 04 C 5622, 2006 WL 644467 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2006) (granting defendant’s summary judgment 
motion); Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, 2005 WL 3286435 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2005) (No. 04 C 5622) (excellent 
plaintiff ’s brief opposing summary judgment). I am certainly not claiming to own any secret formula for 
success. In the past few years, I’ve lost two summary judgment motions on briefs that I hope were decent 
(and that at least were the best I could do).
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big names . . . who went through the NELA/Illinois brainstorming program 
for their briefing and . . . moot-court program . . . . [These cases] were 
unfortunately all too typical: judges deciding summary judgment in 
employment cases have an incredible ability to ignore the black-letter law on 
inferences that they stated . . . pages earlier.5
But only a fraction of plaintiffs’ lawyers participate in such collaborative efforts, 
which are typically limited to members of NELA or similar organizations, are often 
available only in areas with large local chapters (such as the Chicago-based NELA 
chapter), and are almost always offered for only appellate briefings.
 While a good brief is no guarantee of success, a bad brief virtually assures failure: 
almost all of the worst plaintiffs’ briefs reviewed in this study were followed by a grant 
of summary judgment to the defendant. In several cases, the result was a written 
judicial decision further strengthening the pro-defense doctrines to which plaintiffs’ 
lawyers rarely respond effectively: the “same-actor” inference6 and the “stray remarks” 
doctrine.7
5. David L. Lee, Making Your Case Summary Judgment Resistant: Tentative Steps Toward a 
Unified Theory (5th rev. Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Employment-Law.CLE-materials.panel-12.pdf; see also David L. Lee & 
Jennifer C. Weiss, Inferences in Employment Law Compared to Other Areas of the Law: Turning the Rules 
Upside Down, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 781 (2012–2013). 
6. See infra Part II.A. 
7. See generally Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 149 (2012) (discussing and criticizing “stray remarks” doctrine).
Courts often will dismiss a remark offered as evidence of discriminatory intent as 
“stray” before going on to hold . . . that no reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff 
in a case and thus summary judgment is warranted. [A] remark an employment 
discrimination plaintiff proffers to help show that she was discriminated against . . . 
may . . . be deemed “stray” and deemed insufficient or otherwise ignored for . . . the 
following reasons: (1) the remark(s) were made by one too removed from the decision 
making process at issue; (2) the remark(s) were isolated, . . . [and not] part of a broader 
pattern of comments tending to evince bias; (3) the remark(s) were not made with 
sufficient temporal proximity to the adverse action . . . ; (4) the remark(s) were too 
ambiguous . . . ; or (5) the remark(s) were too contextually attenuated from the adverse 
action . . . .
 Id. at 158–59.
  For a recent example of a decision crediting an employment discrimination defendant’s 
interpretation of disputed, arguably stereotypical, comments on a dispositive motion, and thereby 
dismissing the plaintiff ’s claims, see, e.g., Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 
2012) (granting 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss gender discrimination claim).
[Plaintiff] alleges that various officials described [her] as “fragile” . . . [and] “unable to 
handle complex and sensitive issues,” . . . . These descriptors are admittedly 
unflattering—but . . . apply equally to persons of either gender and, . . . are insufficient 
to anchor a gender-stereotyping claim. [T]hat the defendants sometimes referred to her 
as “that girl” during the course of the [employment] extension discussions . . . . does not 
support a reasonable inference of . . . a gender stereotype. . . . [T]hat usage does not 
amount to more than an offhand comment.
 Id. at 225.
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 The question this article addresses is this: When defendants make arguments 
that are rebuttable with strong supporting case law, how often do plaintiffs respond 
effectively? Part II first frames the issues under examination and the relevant case 
law. Part III then discusses the survey and its results. I conclude with recommendations 
as to how the bar can address the concerns raised by the survey’s results.
ii. thE issUEs UndEr EXaMinatiOn and thE rELEVant CasE LaW
 To minimize the subjectivity of assessing briefs as good or bad, this article 
focuses on two issues on which it is easy to look objectively at whether the plaintiff 
briefed the law well:
1.  in district courts, on Rule 56 summary judgment motions, the 
“same-actor defense” that a “strong presumption” of non-
discrimination arises where the person who fired the plaintiff 
was the same person who had hired the plaintiff; and
2.  in appellate courts, on appeals of Rule 12 dismissals, defense 
arguments that complaints fail to state sufficient plausible fact 
allegations under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,8 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.9
These issues are a good focus for studying briefing quality for a pragmatic reason. 
Unlike a subjective grading of briefs, this survey examines a discrete, objective 
question based on the fact that varied and conflicting circuit case law exists on these 
issues (i.e., the merits of the same-actor defense and the breadth of Twombly/Iqbal 
dismissal grounds): where a defendant cites pro-defense case law, one simple test of 
the plaintiff ’s brief is whether it cites the available contrary case law in the same 
circuit and on the same issue.
 The district court portion of this article’s case law review, described in Part II.A, 
focuses on two judicial districts—the Southern District of New York and the 
Northern District of Illinois—that not only exist within circuits featuring conflicting 
case law on the same-actor defense, but also, being large districts in New York and 
Chicago, feature a high volume of case law to study. The appellate court portion of 
this article’s case law review, described in Part II.B., similarly focuses on circuits in 
which, despite the extensive case law dismissing claims pursuant to Twombly and 
Iqbal, there also exists circuit case law construing Twombly and Iqbal narrowly in 
reversing dismissals of plaintiffs’ claims.
 A. Case Law that Plaintiffs’ Briefings Should Cite: The “Same-Actor” Defense
 Defendants regularly provide string cites of the extensive body of decisions 
awarding employers summary judgment based, in part, on the inference that “when 
the person who made the decision to fire . . . [also] made the decision to hire,” that 
8. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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fact “strongly suggest[s] that invidious discrimination was unlikely. . . . [I]t is difficult 
to impute to her an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision 
to hire. This is especially so when the firing has occurred only a short time after the 
hiring.”10 Grady v. Affiliated Central, Inc. is frequently cited for that pro-defense 
holding on the same-actor inference, as is a similar holding in the Seventh Circuit, 
Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp.,11 which affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment partly because “Mr. Adreani was hired by the same management team that 
fired him,” despite the lengthy gap—seven years—between the hiring and firing.12
 But contrary case law exists in the same circuits. Just after Grady, Johnson v. Zema 
Systems Corp.13 rejected the defense with withering criticism:
The psychological assumption underlying the same-actor inference may not 
hold . . . [in a] particular case. For example, a manager might hire a person of 
a certain race expecting them not to rise to a position in the company where 
daily contact with the manager would be necessary. Or an employer might 
hire an employee of a certain gender expecting that person to act, or dress, or 
talk in a way the employer deems acceptable for that gender and then fire that 
employee if she fails to comply with the employer’s gender stereotypes. 
Similarly, if an employee were the first African-American hired, an employer 
might be unaware of his own stereotypical views . . . at the time of hiring. If 
the employer subsequently discovers he does not wish to work with African-
Americans and fires the newly hired employee . . . the employee would still 
have a claim of racial discrimination . . . . It is for these reasons that the same-
actor inference is unlikely to be dispositive in very many cases. In fact, we 
have found no case . . . . in which a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence 
to prove an improper motive was able to produce sufficient evidence to 
otherwise sustain his burden on summary judgment and yet was foreclosed 
from the possibility of relief by the same-actor inference. This is unsurprising 
given that the same-actor inference is not itself evidence of nondiscrimination. 
It simply provides a convenient shorthand for cases in which a plaintiff is 
unable to present sufficient evidence of discrimination.14
As shown in the briefings surveyed (detailed in Part III), the same-actor defense 
regularly wins the day—but Johnson and other similarly pro-plaintiff authorities in 
the Second and Seventh Circuits sharply limit and criticize that defense. These 
authorities support a powerful argument either against the very concept of the same-
actor defense, or at least against its applicability to particular facts. Good plaintiff 
briefings cite them to good effect, as detailed below.
10. Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
11. 154 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1998).
12. Id. at 392, 398 n.5.
13. 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999).
14. Id. at 745 (citations omitted); see also Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 
2001) (affirming defense grant of summary judgment but noting: “We emphatically rejected the ‘same 
actor inference’ in the race-discrimination setting in Johnson . . . ”).
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•	 	Can’t	 employers	 change	 their	 minds	 over	 time? The Second 
Circuit in Carlton v. Mystic Transportation, Inc.15 cited 
Shakespeare to note that, especially where enough time has 
passed from hiring to firing, “the enthusiasm with which the 
actor hired the employee . . . may have waned . . . with the 
passage of time because the relationship between an employer 
and an employee, characterized by reciprocal obligations and 
duties, is . . . subject to time’s ‘wrackful siege of battering days.’”16
•	 	Inapplicable	outside	of	age	discrimination	(ADEA)17	claims? The 
same-actor inference may not even apply at all “outside the . . . 
ADEA[] context in which it generally is applied,” the Second 
Circuit noted in Feingold v. New York;18 another Second Circuit 
decision just under five years later held otherwise,19 but for years, 
that Feingold quote drew district court attention20 and was a 
powerful citation for any non-ADEA plaintiff facing a same-
actor defense.
•	 	Changed	circumstances	undercut	the	defense? Feingold held that if 
there is evidence of “changes in circumstances during the course” 
of employment, the defense “would not necessarily apply.”21 
Catalano v. Lynbrook Glass & Architectural Metals Corp. held that 
“the same-actor inference is further diluted” by relevant events 
during the course of employment, such as a supervisor’s “alleged 
[discriminatory] comment and the raises and bonuses received 
by plaintiff.”22
•	 	Inapplicable	to	promotion	claims	because	willingness	to	hire	may	
not	 indicate	willingness	 to	promote? Harris v. City of New York 
rejected the applicability of this defense in a promotion case 
15. 202 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2000).
16. Id. at 132 (citing William Shakespeare, Sonnet lXV, in The Complete Works of William 
Shakespeare (W.J. Craig ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1928)).
17. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006) (barring employment discrimination 
based on age).
18. 366 F.3d 138, 155 n.15 (2d Cir. 2004).
19. See Anderson v. Hertz Corp., 303 F. App’x 946, 948 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying same-actor inference to 
race discrimination claim).
20. See, e.g., Santiago v. Gen. Dynamics Elec. Boat Div., No. 3:04-cv-2062 (JCH), 2006 WL 3231413, at *5 
(D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2006) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not yet ‘pass[ed] judgment on the extent to which 
this inference is either required or appropriate outside the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) context in which it generally is applied.’”) (citing Feingold, 366 F.3d at 155 n.15).
21. Id.
22. No. 06-CV-2907 (JFB)(AKT), 2008 WL 64693, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2008).
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because “an employer may be willing to hire a member of a 
protected class, but unwilling to promote.”23 Santiago v. General 
Dynamics Electric Boat Division also so held: “most cases dealing 
with this inference” are about firings, while that plaintiff “alleges 
incidents of disparate treatment that do not include termination. 
Thus, this court will not apply the inference.”24
•	 	Insufficient	 for	 summary	 judgment	 because	 the	 same-actor	
inference	is	optional	for	the	jury? Numerous appellate and district 
decisions have held that an employer’s “resort to the ‘same actor 
inference’ is premature” on summary judgment “because . . . it ‘is 
just something for the trier of fact to consider.’”25
 More broadly, contrary to the many decisions granting summary judgment based 
on the same actor defense, there are important, quotable decisions rejecting the 
defense aggressively. Paralleling Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp. in the Seventh Circuit,26 
Copeland v. Rosen in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
gave the following list of reasons not to apply the same-actor defense:
The same actor inference is not a necessary inference, it is only a plausible 
one, and decisions in this Circuit . . . have warned that its use is not to become 
a substitute for a fact-intensive inquiry . . . . There are a variety of plausible 
explanations of such “hire-fire” conduct that may support an inference of 
discriminat[ion] . . . . [I]t is plausible that a supervisor who has not previously 
worked with members of a certain protected class would come to realize his 
or her animus . . . only upon actually hiring and working with such persons. 
It is further plausible that even a supervisor who previously has worked 
congenially with members of a protected class would develop a prejudice 
towards them after, for example, having an experience outside the workplace 
with other members . . . . There may also exist supervisors who purposefully 
hire members of a protected class and then fire them in the hope that the act 
23. No. 03 Civ.6167 DLC, 2004 WL 2943101, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2004).
24. Santiago, 2006 WL 3231413, at *5.
25. Nwanna v. Ashcroft, 66 F. App’x 9, 15 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 
F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Masters v. F.W. Webb Co., No. 03-CV-6280L, 2008 WL 
4181724, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2008) (“[T]he inference alone is generally not a sufficient basis to 
grant summary judgment for the employer, at least when the employee has proffered evidence of 
pretext.”); Santiago, 2006 WL 3231413, at *5 (“[T]his court will not apply the inference, certainly not in 
the context of a summary judgment motion.”); Sklaver v. Casso-Solar Corp., No. 02-CV-9928 (WCC), 
2004 WL 1381264, at *10 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2004) (denying summary judgment because whether 
defendant became discriminatory after hiring was a question of fact: “plaintiff ’s assertion that Canfield 
may have changed his mind about plaintiff ’s age is not necessarily as ‘ludicrous’ as defendant suggests”); 
Ducharme v. Hall Signs, Inc., No. IP99-1756-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1168160, at *11 n.6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 
6, 2001) (granting summary judgment, but rejecting same actor defense: “[Plaintiff ’s] pretext arguments 
fail on their own and without consider[ing] . . . the so-called ‘same actor inference’ . . . . The Seventh 
Circuit has made clear that the ‘same actor inference’ cannot support summary judgment”) (citing 
Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999)).
26. See Johnson, 170 F.3d at 745.
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of hiring will be the focus of attention and will allay any suspicions . . . . 
Moreover, situations may arise where a penitent supervisor is involved, one 
who attempts to assuage his or her guilt in harboring prejudice against other 
employees by hiring members of the protected class, only later to find himself 
or herself overcome again by animus . . . . [T]he Court does not underestimate 
the variety of unlawful motivations which may lurk behind the conduct of a 
person who hires and then fires an individual . . . . Such motivations, like all 
issues of intent, are by their very nature difficult to bring to light, especially 
prior to scrutiny . . . on the stand at trial.27
 Thus plaintiffs’ lawyers easily can rebut a same-actor argument on summary 
judgment—at least in the Second and Seventh Circuits, but likely in many other 
circuits, too, because many circuits feature similar case law criticizing the defense.28 
Even in circuits that lack such case law, plaintiffs’ lawyers could cite other circuits’ 
precedents (such as those above) criticizing and limiting the defense.
27. Copeland v. Rosen, 38 F. Supp. 2d 298, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Sklaver, 2004 WL 1381264, at *10 
n.16.
Copeland . . . warned that “[t]he ‘same actor’ inference is not a necessary inference, it is 
only a plausible one, and decisions in this Circuit addressing it have warned that its use 
is not to become a substitute for a fact-intensive inquiry into the particular circumstances 
of the case . . . .” The court offered a variety of “plausible explanations” for conduct by a 
“same actor” that may “support an inference of discriminatory animus” . . . .
 Id. (citing Copeland, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06).
28. Pro-plaintiff “same actor” authority does exist in various other circuits. For example, a Sixth Circuit en 
banc opinion strongly rejected the notion of the same actor defense as a basis for awarding summary 
judgment:
[On] summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. We therefore reject the idea that a mandatory 
inference must be applied in favor of a summary-judgment movant whenever the claimant 
has been hired and fired by the same individual. Such an approach . . . [is] contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s opinion[,] . . . “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the 
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions . . . 
The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences . . . drawn 
in his favor.” Although the factfinder is permitted to draw this inference, it is by no means 
a mandatory one, and it may be weakened by other evidence. We therefore specifically 
hold that . . . the same-actor inference . . . is insufficient to warrant summary judgment 
 . . . if the employee has otherwise raised a genuine issue of material fact.
 Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 572–74 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing Buhrmaster 
v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing how the length of time from hiring 
to firing an employee may weaken the same actor inference)) (other citations omitted). Accord Goosby v. 
Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is conceivable that an employer 
who harbors a discriminatory animus may nevertheless allow one or two females to advance for the sake of 
appearances.”); Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing a grant of 
summary judgment for the defendant, and declining to afford same actor evidence presumptive value, but 
opining that such facts may support a permissible inference of nondiscrimination).
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 B.  Case Law that Plaintiffs’ Briefings Should Cite: Circuit Precedents Narrowly 
Interpreting the Twombly and Iqbal Decisions that Broadened Rule 12 Dismissal 
Grounds
 In numerous circuits, employment discrimination precedents reject Twombly/
Iqbal dismissal arguments and offer narrow interpretations of those landmark cases, 
which broadened the grounds for granting Rule 12 motions to dismiss. The following 
are examples from several circuits. Given how favorably the below precedents 
interpret Twombly and Iqbal for plaintiffs, it is hard to see why a plaintiffs’ lawyer 
facing a Twombly/Iqbal Rule 12 motion to dismiss in these circuits would fail to cite 
one or more of these precedents.
 Second	Circuit: In 2007, just months after Twombly, Patane v. Clark cited and 
applied it in reversing a dismissal of a hostile work environment and retaliation 
claim.29 Patane offers plaintiffs quotable language that complaints need to offer only 
“notice of the basic events and circumstances” and, without pleading detailed 
evidence, can simply “assume” necessary inferences from those facts:
[T]he district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff ’s retaliation [claim.] . . . [She] 
sufficiently alleged that: (1) Defendants were aware that she complained to 
Arendacs . . . about [harassment by] Clark and Evans; (2) Clark stripped her of 
virtually all of her secretarial duties (among other retaliatory actions . . . ); and 
(3) there was a causal connection . . . .
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not pled . . . that Clark knew that she 
reported his [harassment] . . . as required by the first prong. . . . [But] Plaintiff 
does allege facts from which a reasonable inference of Clark’s knowledge could be 
drawn: she complained about Clark . . . to a Fordham employee[;] . . . notice 
pleading rules “do not require a plaintiff to plead the . . . facts . . . underlying 
his claim[.]” It is not inappropriate at this stage in the litigation to assume 
that in investigating Plaintiff ’s complaints, Arendacs [told] Clark . . . .
The district court faulted Plaintiff for not specifying the severity or degree of . . . 
retaliatory reduction of her job responsibilities, and concluded that, as pled, that 
reduction [was] not . . . adverse employment action . . . . The district court’s 
conclusion is flawed . . . . Only a statement of facts so conclusory that it fails to give 
notice of the basic events and circumstances on which a plaintiff relies should be rejected 
as legally insufficient under 12(b)(6) . . . . [The complaint] is detailed enough . . . 
under this standard. . . . In addition to her allegations about her reduction in job 
responsibilities, Plaintiff alleges that Clark and Evans specifically conspired to 
not give [her] work in order to make her leave.30
 Third	 Circuit: Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside in 2009 cited and applied Iqbal, 
decided just months earlier, in reversing a dismissal of a disability discrimination 
claim.31 Fowler not only details the sort of sparse allegations that can suffice to avoid 
29. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2007).
30. Id. at 111–17 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
31. 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
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dismissal, but declares that even a discrimination complaint “not as rich with detail 
as some might prefer” survives Twombly and Iqbal as long as its averments are 
sufficient to give defendant notice of the basis for plaintiff ’s claim:
Although Fowler’s complaint is not as rich with detail as some might prefer, it 
need only set forth sufficient facts to support plausible claims. Taking her 
allegations as true, we find (1) that she was injured at work and . . . [her] 
employer regarded her as disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 
Act; (2) that there was an opening for a telephone operator at UPMC, 
available prior to the elimination of her position and for which she applied; 
(3) that she was not transferred to that position; (4) that UPMC never 
contacted her about the telephone operator position or any other open 
positions; and (5) that Fowler believed UPMC’s actions were based on her 
disability. Under the plausibility paradigm, these averments are sufficient to 
give UPMC notice of the basis for Fowler’s claim. The complaint pleads how, 
when, and where UPMC allegedly discriminated[,] . . . repeatedly references 
the Rehabilitation Act and specifically claims she was terminated because of 
her disability. . . .
[S]he has nudged her claims against UPMC “across the line from conceivable 
to plausible.” The factual allegations in Fowler’s complaint are “more than 
labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action.” We have no trouble finding that Fowler has adequately pleaded a 
claim for relief under the standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal. “[A] 
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual 
proof of those facts alleged is improbable and that a recovery is very remote 
and unlikely.”32
 Fourth	Circuit: While the Fourth Circuit does not have extensive pro-plaintiff 
case law on Twombly or Iqbal, it does have Ray v. Amelia County Sheriff ’s Office.33 
Decided in 2008, Ray held that
[t]he district court erred in dismissing Ray’s ADEA claim based upon its 
finding that her own complaint produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the defendants’ termination of her employment that rebutted her 
prima facie case, while failing to demonstrate that the reasons stated in her 
own complaint were a pretext.34
Citing more pro-plaintiff Rule 12 precedents—such as the Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A.35 decision from 2002 that Twombly and Iqbal arguably abrogated and the 2007 
be-liberal-if-plaintiff-is-pro-se case Erickson v. Pardus36—Ray held that neither the 
32. Id. at 211–13 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009)) (other citations omitted).
33. 302 F. App’x 209 (4th Cir. 2008).
34. Id. at 211.
35. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
36. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
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existence of a facially apparent non-discriminatory reason nor the lack of pleaded 
facts warrants Rule 12 dismissal:
An employment discrimination claim need not include specific facts establishing a 
prima facie case of discrimination to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but “instead 
must contain only ‘a short and plaint statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Swierkiewicz . . . . A plaintiff ’s statement of her 
claim “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson . . . . The district court erred in dismissing 
Ray’s ADEA claim based upon its finding that her own complaint produced a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the defendants’ termination of her 
employment that rebutted her prima facie case, while failing to demonstrate 
that the reasons stated in her own complaint were a pretext for discrimination. 
Ray was not required to plead specific facts establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination in her complaint, let alone to plead facts showing that the non-
discriminatory reason for termination suggested by her own complaint was pretextual. 
Ray was required only to state her claim so as to give the defendants fair notice of its 
nature and the grounds upon which it rests, with enough factual allegations to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible, not merely speculative.37
 Seventh	Circuit: In 2008, Tamayo v. Blagojevich reversed a dismissal of various 
discrimination and retaliation claims, with multiple pro-plaintiff passages.38 Tamayo 
stressed that Twombly “‘must not be overread’” because it merely “establish[es] ‘two 
easy-to-clear hurdles’ for a complaint”39—and thus the circuit reaffirmed its pre-
Twombly employment discrimination precedents holding that plaintiffs can “allege 
these claims quite generally,” need not “allege all, or any, of the facts logically 
entailed,” “certainly need not include evidence,” and “are entitled to discovery before 
being put to their proof ”:40
[An] employment discrimination [plaintiff] . . . may allege these claims quite 
generally. . . . [and] need not “allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed by 
the claim,” and . . . certainly need not include evidence. Bennett v. Schmidt . . . 
(7th Cir. 1998); Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist. . . . (7th Cir. 2006) (“[C]omplaints 
plead claims rather than facts.”). . . . “Litigants are entitled to discovery before 
being put to their proof, and treating the allegations . . . [as the] proof leads to 
windy complaints and defeats . . . Rule 8.” Bennett . . . .
Bell Atlantic “must not be overread.” Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of  Lemont . . . 
(7th Cir.2008). Although the opinion contains some language that could be 
read to suggest otherwise, . . . Bell Atlantic made clear that it did not . . . 
supplant the basic notice-pleading standard. . . . Lang v. TCF Nat’ l Bank . . . 
(7th Cir. 2007) (. . . notice-pleading is still all that is required); Limestone . . . 
(same). . . .
37. Ray, 302 F. App’x at 211 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508; Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93) (emphasis added).
38. 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 1082–84.
40. Id. at 1081.
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Bell Atlantic . . . establish[es] “two easy-to-clear hurdles” . . . “First, the 
complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant 
fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Second, 
its allegations must plausibly suggest . . . a right to relief . . . above a ‘speculative 
level’” . . . . Concentra . . . . Acknowledging that a complaint must contain 
something more than a general recitation of the elements . . . , we nevertheless 
reaffirmed the minimal pleading standard for simple claims of race or sex 
discrimination. . . . “[O]nce a plaintiff alleging illegal discrimination has 
clarified that it is on the basis of her race, there is no further information that 
is both easy to provide and of clear critical importance . . . . Requiring a more 
detailed complaint . . . would have replicated the inefficient chase for facts 
decried [in pre-Twombly precedents.]” Concentra . . . . Even after Bell Atlantic, 
. . . [complaints] need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified) 
adverse employment action . . . on the basis of [plaintiff ’s] sex.41
 There is no excuse for plaintiffs’ lawyers not to rebut defendants’ Twombly/Iqbal 
arguments for dismissal with case law like that above. Even outside of these circuits, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers certainly could cite other circuits’ cases narrowly construing, or 
powerfully distinguishing, the defenses’ Twombly/Iqbal arguments for dismissal.
iii.  sUrVEYing pLaintiffs’ UsE Of CasE LaW in thEir appELLatE and 
distriCt COUrt briEfings
 The survey included thirty-five cases from the Southern District of New York 
and the Northern District of Illinois in which a plaintiff asserted claims of 
employment discrimination. For each case, the defendant’s summary judgment brief 
was available on Westlaw (allowing for a terms-and-connectors search for the 
relevant arguments), the plaintiff ’s was available on either Westlaw or the court’s 
PACER website, and the court issued a decision either granting or denying summary 
judgment. Although these cases do not comprise a complete sample, this sample is 
large enough to yield a sense of the typical quality of plaintiffs’ briefs.42
 A. An Assessment of Same-Actor Briefings on District Court Summary Judgment Motions
 Bad brief-writers overwhelmingly lose, while good brief-writers at least have a 
fighting chance. The following is a review of defendants’ summary judgment briefs 
pressing the “same actor” argument, of how (or whether) plaintiffs’ responsive briefs 
rebutted the argument, and of what the courts then ruled. Of the briefings in the 
sample of thirty-five cases, only seven plaintiffs’ briefs argued the same-actor issue 
41. Id. at 1081–84 (citing Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2008); 
EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2007); Lang v. TCF Nat’l 
Bank, 249 F. App’x. 464, 466–67 (7th Cir. 2007); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 
1998); Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 1986)).
42. Further, obtaining this sample entailed review of many more than thirty-five cases. In numerous cases, 
the defendant’s brief was available online, but the plaintiff ’s was neither on Westlaw nor on PACER. 
Moreover, the Westlaw databases are incomplete, as are publicly searchable electronic case dockets, 
which also sometimes make one side’s brief inaccessible due to a confidentiality order.
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plausibly well, three of which met my criteria for a “good” brief. In the other twenty-
eight cases, the plaintiffs either failed to rebut the argument at all or rebutted it only 
with short assertions devoid of any of the available pro-plaintiff case law. Of the 
seven good plaintiffs’ briefings, three of those plaintiffs survived summary judgment. 
Of the twenty-eight bad briefings, only four of the plaintiffs survived summary 
judgment, while twenty-two plaintiffs lost when the court granted summary 
judgment to the defendants, and two plaintiffs settled.
  1. The Good
 Most of the good briefs are quite good at rebutting the same-actor defense with 
apt case law. Below are key excerpts from the three good briefs.
Mantia v. The Great Books Foundation:43
TGBF relies on an outdated argument called the “same actor inference” . . . . 
TGBF argues that because the same person who tired Mantia also “promoted” 
her . . . he must not be biased against older people. The Seventh Circuit has 
“emphatically rejected the ‘same actor inference.’” Kadas v. MC [sic] 
Systemhouse Corp. [7th Cir. 2001], citing Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp. [7th 
Cir. 1999]. The inference itself is not “dispositive,” but “simply provides a 
convenient shorthand for cases in which a plaintiff is unable to present 
sufficient evidence of discrimination[.] . . . In none of the cases cited by 
TGBF did the plaintiff present evidence like Mantia’s—evidence of an 
admitted preference for younger employees, disdain for and disparate 
treatment of older employees, and serious doubt about the reasons articulated 
by the employer for the discharge.44
Gladwin v. Pozzi:45
[T]he “same actor” inference is not a necessary inference, it is only a plausible 
one, and decisions . . . have warned that its use is not to become a substitute for 
a fact-intensive inquiry into the particular circumstances . . . . Sklaver v. Casso-
Solar Corp. [S.D.N.Y. 2004]. For a number of reasons, the “same actor” defense 
should not prevail as a matter of law here. First, unlike in the cases cited by 
defendants, four and a half years passed between plaintiff ’s hiring and firing, 
thus dampening the . . . inference. See Carlton v. Mystic Transp. [2d Cir. 2000] 
(“Such an inference is strong where the time elapsed between the events of 
hiring and firing is brief. Here it is not. And, the enthusiasm with which the 
actor hired the employee . . . may have waned with the passage of time because 
the relationship between an employer and an employee, characterized by 
43. No. 01 C 8971, 2003 WL 22143255 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2003).
44. Brief for Plaintiff in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 24, Mantia v. Great Books Found., 2003 WL 
22143255 (Apr. 8, 2003) (No. 01 C 8971) (citing Kadas v. MCI Sys. Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 
2007); Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999)) (other citations omitted) 
(distinguishing defendants’ cases). Plaintiff ’s counsel, Carolyn Shapiro, Esq., was then at Miner, 
Barnhill & Galland in Chicago, Illinois, but is now a law professor at the Illinois Institute of 
Technology’s Chicago-Kent School of Law. 
45. Gladwin v. Pozzi, No. 06 Civ. 0650(SCR)(JFK), 2010 WL 245575 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010).
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reciprocal obligations and duties, is . . . subject to time’s ‘wrackful siege of 
battering days.’”); Nanton v. City of New York [S.D.N.Y. 2007] (“Since roughly 
two-and-a-half years passed . . . [the] inference is insufficient . . . .”). Second, 
unlike in the cited cases, plaintiff has adduced evidence of disparate treatment 
. . . . Third, . . . plaintiff complained to Pozzi of disparate treatment and that he 
responded hostilely . . . within days . . . . See Feingold v. New York [2d Cir. 2004] 
(“[The] inference would not necessarily apply here given the changes in 
circumstances . . . ,” including plaintiff ’s complaints . . . ). Finally, the fact that 
Pozzi chose to replace plaintiff with a less qualified white male further negates 
the . . . inference. Richards v. Calvet [S.D.N.Y. 2005].46
Quinby v. WestLB AG:47
[Once] Mr. Parker assumed leadership . . . his role changed materially, 
rendering . . . the “same actor inference” inappropriate. The Second Circuit 
has refused to apply the same actor inference . . . where the circumstances of 
the plaintiff ’s employment had changed over time. . . . [A]lso . . . [the] Second 
Circuit has not ruled on whether “same actor inference” applies to Title VII 
claims at all. [And the] same actor inference does not apply if significant 
amount of time has passed between hiring and firing. . . . Even if Mr. Parker 
had been responsible for hiring . . . Ms. Quinby while Mr. Leithhead was in 
charge, under radically different conditions (e.g., Mr. Parker supplanting Mr. 
Leithhead as CEO), the “same actor” may take very different actions with 
respect to a particular employee.48
  2. The Bad and the Ugly
 This article categorizes briefs as “bad” not based on subtle shortcomings or gray 
areas in how well they argue a point, but rather on whether the plaintiffs meaningfully 
rebuttted defense same-actor arguments. In all of the “bad” plaintiffs’ briefs, the 
defendants made the “same-actor” argument, but the plaintiffs either failed to rebut the 
argument at all or rebutted it only with cursory assertions lacking citations to any of the 
available pro-plaintiff case law. The following discussion details how many plaintiffs in 
cases from the survey failed to offer an adequate, or any, response to the defendants’ 
46. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 29–30, 
Gladwin v. Pozzi, 2010 WL 245575 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (No. 06 Civ. 0650(SCR)(LMS)) (citing 
Sklaver v. Casso-Solar Corp., No. 02-CV-9928 (WCC), 2004 WL 1381264, at *10 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. May 
15, 2004); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d. Cir. 2006); Nanton v. City of New 
York, 05 Civ. 8989 (DLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58874, at *14–15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2007); 
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 155 (2d Cir. 2004); Richards v. Calvet, 99 Civ. 12172 (RJH)
(MHD), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5365, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005)). Plaintiff ’s counsel, Michael 
Sussman and Christopher Watkins, are named partners at Sussman & Watkins, Goshen, New York. 
47. No. 04 Civ. 7406 (WHP), 2008 WL 3826695 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008). 
48. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 27–28, 
Quinby v. WestLB AG, 2008 WL 3826695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) (No. 04 Civ. 7406 (WHP) (HBP)) 
(citations omitted). Plaintiff ’s counsel, Kathleen Peratis & Tammy Marzigliano, are with Outten & 
Golden LLP, New York, New York.
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same-actor argument: (i) offering no rebuttal at all; (ii) offering some rebuttal, but not a 
meaningful one; or (iii) effectively defaulting by not filing a reply at all.
   i. No Rebuttal at All
 In many cases, plaintiffs’ briefings offered literally no rebuttal to the same-actor 
arguments—not even mentioning “same actor,” the pro-defense cases defendants 
cited, or any of the pro-plaintiff precedents.
 O’Shields v. Liberty Mutual Insurance:49 This memorandum of law consisted of 
thirty-four numbered paragraphs and cited just six cases offering only unhelpfully 
general citations to basic, well-known summary judgment standards (Celotex, Liberty 
Lobby, McDonnell Douglas, etc.).50 The court granted the defendant summary 
judgment in an unpublished decision.51
 Parker v. City of Elgin:52 This brief cited seven cases, including Liberty Lobby, two 
discrimination cases, and four cases on plaintiff ’s separate Due Process claim.53 The 
court granted the defendant summary judgment.54
 Rinsler v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.:55 In this particularly awful brief, most 
cases cited were just in reusable boilerplate form (McDonnell Douglas, etc.); the text 
also contained incorrect grammar and misspellings, such as, “Defendants’ suggestion 
that because Allegra is also Caucasion [sic] is a red herring.”56 The brief also contained 
many unreadable, likely dictated sentences, like the following: “Plaintiff had every 
reason to believe that her employment would continue, as she relied on the course of 
actions that occurred the year prior, when she was kept on, as she had been hired as 
a full time employee, as others had not.”57 The court granted the defendant summary 
judgment and expressly credited the same-actor defense.58
 Hoskins v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital:59 This brief not only failed to rebut the 
“same-actor” argument at all on the law or the facts, but also affirmatively conceded, 
“Kangas stated that she was the decision-maker in [the plaintiff ’s] . . . termination” and 
49. 1:02-CV-09218 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 4, 2004). 
50. Plaintiff ’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4–7, O’Shields v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co. (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2004) (No. 02 C 9218). 
51. O’Shields, 1:02-CV-09218 (Docket Entry No. 25). 
52. No. 03 C 0171, 2005 WL 2171159 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2005).
53. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Parker v. 
City of Elgin, 2005 WL 2171159 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2004) (No. 03 C 0171). 
54. Parker, 2005 WL 2171159.
55. No. 02-Civ. 4096 (SAS), 2003 WL 22015434 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
56. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Rinsler v. 
Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 2003 WL 22015434 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003) (No. CV 4096 (SAS)).
57. Id.
58. Rinsler, 2003 WL 22015434, at *7.
59. No. 01 C 1116, 2002 WL 1424562 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2002).
856
(In)competence In AppellAte And dIstrIct court BrIef WrItIng NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
conceded that the plaintiff “d[id] not have any first-hand knowledge whether Kangas 
was the decision-maker.”60 The court granted defendant summary judgment.61
   ii. No Meaningful Rebuttal
 The following briefs offered only a short rebuttal, failed to counter the defendant’s 
same-actor argument meaningfully, and offered none of the available pro-plaintiff 
case law.
 Lenhoff v. Getty:62 In this brief, the plaintiff offered no other cases, conceded that 
a decision by the same actor yielded a “strong inference” of non-discrimination, cited 
no pro-plaintiff case law, and simply declared the plaintiff ’s factual evidence strong: 
“Grady does not present an unrebuttable presumption, but only a strong inference, 
against discriminatory intent. Plaintiff respectfully submits that, in light of the 
circumstances surrounding plaintiff ’s termination, she has overcome this strong 
inference.”63 The court granted the defendant summary judgment and expressly 
credited the same-actor defense.64
 Issacs v. City of New York:65 The plaintiff ’s brief did not cite any same-actor case 
law or rebut the defense’s argument for a same-actor inference at all.66 The evidence 
for the inference was just one manager’s involvement, among a group of 
decisionmakers, in both the hiring and the firing.67 The briefing simply declared, 
with strident verbiage, that the one “same actor” was part of a committee—which 
the case law holds sufficient for application of the defense:
Defendants also argue that racial discrimination could not have played any 
role in the decision to terminate Plaintiff, because the same person who 
ultimately hired Plaintiff is the same person who ultimately terminated him. 
This argument is disingenuous. . . . [T]he record conclusively establishes that 
Commissioner Horn did not terminate Plaintiff on his own.68
The court granted the defendant summary judgment and expressly credited the 
same-actor defense.69
60. Plaintiff ’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Hoskins v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 
2002 WL 32604413 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2002) (No. 01 C 1116) (Kangas was the plaintiff ’s direct 
supervisor).
61. Hoskins, 2002 WL 32604413, at *7.
62. No. 97 CIV. 9458 (LMM), 2000 WL 977900 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000).
63. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, 
Lenhoff v. Getty, 2000 WL 977900 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1999) (No. 97 Civ. 9458). 
64. Lenhoff, 2000 WL 977900, at *5.
65. No. 04 Civ. 5108(PAC), 2005 WL 3466051 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2005).
66. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Isaacs v. City 
of New York, 2005 WL 3466051 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005) (No. 04 Civ. 5108).
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 19.
69. Isaacs, 2005 WL 3466051, at *4.
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 De la Cruz v. City of New York:70 The plaintiff ’s brief cited no same-actor case law 
and, more generally, was a remarkably ungrammatical twelve pages that reads like 
unedited dictation.71 The court granted the defendant summary judgment and 
expressly credited the same-actor defense.72
   iii. Defaulting on the Motion 
 Thompson v. American Family Insurance:73 Plaintiff ’s counsel defaulted, filing no 
opposition papers, despite two deadline extensions.74 On August 21, 2008, counsel 
sought and received an extension until September 10, 2008; then, on September 10, 
counsel sought and received an extension to September 17, citing computer 
problems.75 When counsel then defaulted after filing nothing for almost three 
months, the court granted summary judgment.76
 Robinson v. New York City Department of Education:77 The plaintiff ’s counsel 
defaulted here as well, filing nothing in opposition.78 The court granted summary 
judgment.79
  3. The Ensuing Case Law
 In four of the losses suffered by plaintiffs who briefed summary judgment badly, 
the court issued a decision relying upon the same-actor theory as a basis for granting 
summary judgment.80 The remaining cases, in which decisions were unavailable, 
may be examples of “no harm, no foul,” because the court did not expressly rely upon 
the same-actor theory. On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ failure to brief the issue 
may still have affected the outcome: unnecessarily conceding rebuttable points is no 
way to convince a judge of the merits of the case. This lawyering failure easily could 
have contributed to the judge’s view that the case was too weak to survive summary 
judgment. Notably, all four pro-“same-actor” decisions came after bad briefings, 
whereas none of the well-briefed motions yielded a judicial decision adopting the 
same-actor theory.
70. 783 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
71. Memorandum for Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, De la Cruz v. 
City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010) (No. 09 CIV 4905 (FM)).
72. De la Cruz, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 642.
73. No. 1:06-CV-04059 (N.D. Ill. dismissed July 31, 2009).
74. Id. (Docket Nos. 31, 35). 
75. Id. (Docket No. 35).
76. Id. (Docket No. 38).
77. No. 1:08CV10293 (S.D.N.Y. dismissed Dec. 30, 2010). 
78. Id. (Docket No. 19).
79. Id. (Docket No. 30).
80. The four cases were Rinsler, Lenhoff, Issacs, and Hoskins.
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 B.  Twombly/Iqbal Appellate Briefings: Again Plaintiffs Too Often Fail to Exploit 
Available Pro-Plaintiff Case Law—But Less Often than in District Court Briefings
 Plaintiffs’ appellate briefings appear to be of higher quality overall than plaintiffs’ 
district court briefings, possibly for a variety of reasons. First, as noted above, 
plaintiffs draw moot court and briefwriting support from the bar for appellate cases 
more often than for district cases. Second, perhaps some plaintiffs’ lawyers who lost 
in district court refer their appeals to attorneys with more appellate expertise and 
experience. Finally, perhaps plaintiffs’ lawyers who know they have limited brief-
writing skills avoid appealing their losses. This survey did not compile any 
comprehensive sample of good versus bad appellate briefs addressing Twombly/Iqbal 
issues, partly because far from all employment discrimination cases feature Rule 12 
motions, and partly because appellate cases (unlike district court briefings) are not 
numerous enough to allow general conclusions. The existence of readily available, 
quality briefings, however, shows that there is less of a pervasive bad-briefing 
problem at the appellate level than at the district court level, though some appellate 
briefings are as bad as the typical district briefing in failing to rebut well-established 
arguments with readily available case law.
 The Seventh Circuit’s Tamayo v. Blagojevich81 decision may be the single most 
pro-plaintiff employment discrimination decision, reiterating the modest nature of 
the notice pleading burden post-Twombly. It stressed that Twombly “must not be 
overread” because it merely “establish[es] ‘two easy-to-clear hurdles’ for a complaint”; 
it thus reaffirmed pre-existing precedents holding that employment discrimination 
plaintiffs can “allege these claims quite generally,” “need not allege all, or any, of the 
facts logically entailed,” “certainly need not include evidence,” and “are entitled to 
discovery before being put to their proof.”82 Tamayo dates to May 2008, so even 
granting a grace period for the decision to draw notice, any Seventh Circuit plaintiffs 
appealing Twombly/Iqbal Rule 12 dismissals as of 2009 really should cite Tamayo, 
unless they have other authority for narrowly interpreting Twombly/Iqbal. An 
excellent use of Tamayo appears in the plaintiff ’s Seventh Circuit brief in Feinberg v. 
RM Acquisition, LLC,83 a claim of retirement benefits interference under Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act § 510:
A complaint need only provide a “short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” [Iqbal] . . . and contain “enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . Twombly . . . . 
Thus, all that is required is a statement sufficient to provide the defendant 
with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis.84 Tamayo . . . .
81. 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
82. Id.
83. 629 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2010).
84. Brief and App’x for Plaintiffs-Appellants at *7–*8, Feinberg v. RM Acquisition, LLC, 629 F.3d 671 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-cv-695).
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Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant RM Acquisition and Rand McNally “entered 
into an asset purchase agreement to transfer the remaining assets . . . [with] the 
specific intent of interfering with the Plaintiffs’ rights by attempting to evade 
their existing and future liability under the [retirement plan].” . . . No more 
specificity was needed . . . , as Plaintiffs provided Defendant with “fair notice” 
of the claim and its basis. Tamayo . . . (quoting Twombly . . . ). Additionally, this 
Circuit has warned time and again that courts must “construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts 
alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in her favor.”85
[T]he district court misstates . . . the plan when it defines the Plan Administrator 
as “Rand McNally” . . . [not] “the Company,” which includes . . . “any 
successor[,]” . . . [including defendant] RM Acquisition because of its asset 
purchase of Rand McNally. . . . The Complaint itself addresses [this] issue of 
successor liability . . . . [T]he district court failed to “construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . . ”86
 But in Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center,87 another Seventh Circuit case, the 
plaintiff ’s briefing failed to cite Tamayo while instead citing mainly pre-Twombly case 
law in its argument for a narrow interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal. The district court,
[w]hile recognizing that Hatmaker had plead . . . Title VII retaliation . . . 
went on to hold that she did not specifically reference the “opposition” clause 
[and,] . . . [a]s such, . . . effectively waived this claim. This conclusion would 
seem to mandate that Title VII plaintiffs must plead not only that they had 
been retaliated against, but also must allege which prong of the statute under 
which they . . . proceed.88
Plaintiff ’s appellate brief argued that “[s]uch a conclusion is inconsistent with the 
tenets of federal notice pleading and ignores the important role that both discovery 
and summary judgment play in federal civil litigation.”89 But while the brief could 
have drawn substantial support from Tamayo and other post-Twombly Seventh 
Circuit authority (such as one leading case Tamayo cited extensively, EEOC v. 
Concentra Health Services90), it unpersuasively cited almost entirely pre-2007 case law 
85. Id. at *27.
86. Id. at *29–*30.
87. 619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010). 
88. Brief and Required Short App’x for Plaintiff-Appellant at *29, Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 
741 (Mar. 3, 2010) (No. 09-3002).
89. Id.
90. 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). The court in EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., explained that
Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement of the claim” must contain a minimal level of 
factual detail, although that level is indeed very minimal. See Bell Atlantic . . . . The classic 
verbal formula is that a complaint need only be sufficiently detailed to “give the defendant 
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. . . . “[T]he 
intent of the liberal notice pleading system is to ensure that claims are determined on their 
merits rather than through missteps in pleading.” 2 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 8.04 (3d ed. 2006); see also Swierkiewicz. . . . Requiring a plaintiff to 
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that, because it preceded both Twombly and Iqbal, provides essentially no support for 
narrowly interpreting Twombly and Iqbal.91
 Also instructive is a comparison of plaintiffs’ briefings in two cases in the Third 
Circuit, in which a 2009 appellate decision, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, offered a 
similarly pro-plaintiff post-Twombly/Iqbal employment discrimination precedent, 
holding that even a discrimination complaint “not as rich with detail as some might 
prefer” survives Twombly and Iqbal as long as its “averments are sufficient to give 
[defendant] notice of the basis for [plaintiff ’s] claim.”92 Yet the plaintiff ’s 2010 brief 
appealing a dismissal in Holmes v. Gates93 contained only one unhelpful, boilerplate 
quote from Fowler in the “Standard of Review” paragraph: “While ‘[a] complaint has 
to ‘show’ [an entitlement to relief] with its facts . . . [t]his ‘plausibility’ determination 
will be ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.’”94 The argument section in the Holmes brief was 
unusually short (barely 2300 words) and lacked any mention that there indeed are 
post-Twombly decisions upholding employment discrimination claims as sufficient 
under Rule 12.
 In contrast, in Golod v. Bank of America Corp.,95 the plaintiff ’s 2010 appellate brief 
made strong use of Fowler to argue against a district court Twombly/Iqbal-based 
dismissal, effectively contrasting the plaintiff ’s case and Fowler with another 
precedent that affirmed a dismissal for insufficient fact allegations:
Fowler . . . do[es] not require the specific detailed factual particulars of a 
claim to be pled . . . Even after Twombly, and Iqbal, . . . all factual allegations 
are to be considered true, . . . the complaint is to be construed in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, and . . . the Court must . . . determine whether, 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled 
to relief. Fowler . . . [Twombly] made it clear . . . a court must take the 
plead detailed facts interferes with that goal in multiple ways. First, and most importantly, 
the number of factual details potentially relevant to any case is astronomical, and requiring 
a plaintiff to plead facts that are not obviously important and easy to catalogue would result 
in “needless controversies” about what is required that could serve only to delay or prevent 
trial. Most details are more efficiently learned through the f lexible discovery process. 
Swierkiewicz. . . . “Instead of lavishing attention on the complaint until the plaintiff gets it 
just right, a district court should keep the case moving.” . . . Second, a plaintiff might 
sometimes have a right to relief without knowing every factual detail supporting its right; 
requiring the plaintiff to plead those unknown details before discovery would improperly 
deny the plaintiff the opportunity to prove its claim.
 Id. at 779–80 (some citations omitted).
91. The one post-Twombly case cited was a very general snippet about notice pleading—“[l]itigants need not 
plead legal theories”—from a non-employment case that itself did not cite Twombly or Iqbal. Ortiz v. 
Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2009).
92. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211–12.
93. 403 F. App’x 670 (3d Cir. 2010).
94. Appellant’s Brief and App’x Vol. I at 5, Holmes v. Gates, 403 F. App’x 670 (July 28, 2012) (No. 10-2059) 
(citing Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210–11).
95. 403 F. App’x 699 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the Court may be. [Fowler.] . . . 
[A]t the early pleading stage a Plaintiff need not plead particulars[,] . . . only 
the nature of their claim. Fowler . . . . [Fowler held] a claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act only required a claim of being disabled, and need not go 
into particulars about the life activity affected . . . [or] the nature of her 
substantial limitations. Fowler . . . [S]o long as the complaint notifies the 
defendant of claimed impairment, the substantially limited life activity need 
not be . . . plead[ed,] . . . Fowler . . . , even after Twombly and Iqbal.
Similarly, Mrs. Golod pled sufficient facts . . . of being denied educational 
opportunities, the ability to exercise supervision, use her training and skills, as 
well as denial of promotional opportunities. These . . . [establish] a factual basis 
to allow . . . discovery to search out the exact times and dates of each . . . [as] the 
particulars of the factual evidence showing . . . discriminatory intent . . . , just 
as allowed in Fowler. . . . Mrs. Golod stated that she was a member of a 
protected group both by religion, Jewish, and by national origin, Russian, 
alleged that she had been denied the use of her education, two Masters Degrees, 
one in Electrical Engineering and one in Applied Mathematics, (Complaint, 
¶¶ 16 & 18), forced to use older technology . . . [and] not allowed to work with 
newer technology, taken out of the Development Area, (¶ 20), denied a 
promotion in 2004, (¶ 24), put in a position outside her department which did 
not require her professional or technical expertise, (¶ 24), denied all educational 
opportunities for which she applied, (¶ 25), and was “continually denied 
promotions” even though individuals with less experience were being promoted, 
(¶ 26), and finally denied authority given to other employees . . . (¶ 27). . . . 
Mrs. Golod’s evaluations . . . met or exceeded defendant’s expectations, (¶¶ 21 
& 28) . . . . [These] allegations would create [a] reasonable expectation . . . [for] 
further discovery. Fowler . . . .
[This] case is significantly different from . . . [cases that] upheld a post 
Twombly and Iqbal dismissal. In Guirguis [3rd Cir. 2009], . . . the complaint 
which made only three allegations, the Plaintiff was an Egyptian native of 
Arab descent, he was discharged, and his termination was in violation of his 
Civil Rights, did not “cross the threshold established by Twombly and Iqbal,” 
since the first two allegations provided no facts supporting inference of 
discrimination, and the third was “precisely the type of factually unsupported 
legal conclusion that is inadequate [under] Rule 12(b)(6) . . . .” [Id.] By 
comparison . . . Golod’s allegations . . . are more than the prohibited 
“formulaic recitation of the elements.” [Fowler.]
The lower Court erroneously required that Mrs. Golod plead each 
promotional or educational and promotional opportunity she was denied. . . . 
[T]here is no necessity to plead . . . particulars . . . at the “early pleadings 
stage.” Fowler . . . During discovery Mrs. Golod would . . . [have] her 
personnel file, or other records . . . in the defendant’s possession, to determine 
the specific details of . . . opportunities she was denied[,] . . . [creating] 
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reasonable expectation that discovery would reveal . . . the necessary 
element[s.]96
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 Based on a limited survey of appellate and district court briefings in employment 
discrimination cases, this article finds that, surprisingly, many briefings by plaintiffs’ 
counsel are of extremely poor quality. That finding raises a broad range of questions. 
Why do clients choose such lawyers, and what can be done to improve clients’ efforts 
to select competent lawyers? How can lawyers filing incompetent, doomed briefs 
maintain a law practice? Finally, what might be done to improve this state of affairs? 
As with any complex problem, answers to these questions will require, and hopefully 
will be the subject of, further study.
96. Brief of Appellant at *10–*22, Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., 403 F. App’x 699 (Feb. 9, 2010) (No. 
09-2907) (some citations omitted).
